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Leading papers in  a journal’s issue attract, on average, more citations than those that 
follow. It is, however, difficult to assess whether they are of better quality (as is often 
suggested), or whether this happens just because they appear first in an issue. We make 
use of a natural experiment that was carried out by a journal in which papers are randomly 
ordered in some issues, while this order is not random in others. We show that leading 
papers in randomly ordered issues also attract more citations, which casts some doubt on 




Several papers (Scott and Waldfogel, 1996, Ayres and Vars, 2000, Hudson, 2007, Oswald, 2007) 
raise the possibility that the leading (that is first placed) article in an issue of a journal attracts 
more citations than those that appear later. Pinkowitz (2000) draws the same conclusion based on 
web site downloads of articles that are (pre) published on the website of the Journal of Finance. 
The hypothesis is tested by running a regression of the number of citations (or downloads) of an 
article  on  the  order  in  which  it  is  placed,  and  on  some  other  variables,  such  as  time  since 
                                                 
* We are grateful to Orley Ashenfelter, John Hudson and Andrew Oswald for extremely useful comments on a 
preliminary version,  2 
publication, journal, and subject area (Ayres and Vars, 2000), as well as number of authors, self-
citations and whether it is the author’s first paper (Hudson, 2007).
1 
  Though this is not Oswald’s (2007) main concern, he suggests that “the way in which 
[editors] arranged the order of publication, … turned out, ex post, to … what now looks like prior 
foresight” about which papers are good and which are less so. He also suggests that it seems 
worth  exploring  “what  editors  know,  and  exactly  how  they  know  it”  when  they  make  their 
decision on the ordering of papers. 
  However, it is difficult to assert that leading articles are of better quality and therefore 
attract more citations (which we take, but only ex post, as a quality signal). They may attract 
more citations just because they appear first in a journal’s issue. The problem is that, in various 
contexts, such as artistic (Ginsburgh and Van Ours, 2003), sports (Lee, 2004) and even scientific 
(Coupé, 2007) competitions where evaluation is subjective, the order of appearance of subjects 
(Ginsburgh and Van Ours, 2003), or other factors such as an outlier aversion bias (Lee, 2004) 
affect the way judges perceive quality. If the order in which articles appear in academic journals 
plays a similar role it would make little sense to suspect a causal relation between leading article 
and quality, and citations.    
  This could be given a straightforward answer if an editor were ready to run an experiment 
which would consist in ordering papers in a random way in some issues, while in other issues, 
she would order them in some thoughtful way (using her gut feelings and experience). One could 
then test whether leading articles in randomly ordered issues also attract more citations than 
those that appear later, and whether the differences between the two orderings (random and 
“thoughtful”) are statistically significantly different.
2  
  European Economic Review (EER) provides such an “experiment.” Between 1975 and 
1997 some issues use the initial of the first author’s surname to order papers (the issues in which 
the order is alphabetical are reported in Appendix Table A2), others do not. As long as one is 
ready to accept that the alphabetical order is random, in the sense that on average it cannot help 
sorting  good  and  bad  papers,
3  this  can  be  considered  as  a  natural  experiment.  If  in 
“alphabetically  ordered”  issues,  leading  papers  get  more  citations  than  others,  then  one  can 
wonder whether editors really have a good guess at quality when they order in a thoughtful way. 
                                                 
1 See also Oswald (2008) for a related paper that provides a way of testing whether journals discriminate across 
nationalities (essentially European vs American authors), and whether there is a pro-Harvard bias in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics.  
2 This idea was exploited by Ayres and Vars (2000, pp. 444-445) using law reviews, but they pooled different 
journals, some of which were using the alphabetical order, some were not.  
3 Note that some papers (for example, Einav and Yariv, 2006) suggest that authors whose names appear early in the 
alphabet are more likely to receive tenure. There seems thus to be discrimination on the basis of the initial of the 
surname. There is  also a small probability that alphabetical and quality orderings are identical.  We  ignore this 
possibility.  3 
Leading papers are more cited because they are leading (and/or readers expect them to be better), 
and not because they are of better quality. 
  Before moving to our analysis, focused on the natural experiment in EER, we briefly 
describe the results obtained by Scott and Waldfogel (1996), Ayres and Vars (2000), Hudson, 
(2007) Oswald (2007) and Pinkowitz (2000). They all find that the order of a paper in an issue 
matters, and that better placed papers generate more citations. The number of pages has also a 
positive  impact,  whereas  notes  are  much  less  cited.  Hudson  (2007)  finds  that  self-citations 
generate more citations, since they provide additional signals with respect to the quality of the 
cited paper. He also points out that a highly cited paper has a positive impact on the citations of 
other papers in the same issue. According to Hudson, this highlights, “the role chance can play in 




The analysis that follows will aim at comparing the number of citations conditional on ordering, 
which may be alphabetical or not in the case of European Economic Review (EER). To check for 
consistency, we will also compare this with citations to papers in American Economic Review 
(AER), where the order is never alphabetical (except by chance).
4 Special issues (such as EER 
and  AER  Papers  and  Proceedings,  International  Seminars  on  Macroeconomics  or 
Microeconomics that EER was publishing once a year some years ago) as well as editorials that 
appear as first paper in some issues were not taken into account.
5 
  Table 1 gives a first descriptive view of the average number of citations conditional on 
order. The results show that in all cases, the first paper in an issue gets more citations, but 
standard deviations are very large. In contrast, the difference in citations with the second ordered 
paper is not very large. Finally, citations per paper are rather constant  after the fifth paper, 
though there may be sudden surges such as the tenth paper in EER (non-alphabetical ordering) 
and in AER, which both get a larger number of cites than the first ordered paper.
 6   
                                                 
4 The order may have been random before 1985, at a time where the journal had a large backlog of papers, and some 
papers were published when ready for publication, and in that order. The fact that there was a large backlog at the 
time is mentioned in the editor’s report in American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 73 (1983), p. 402, 
but nothing is mentioned about the way papers were ordered in the various issues. However, to make sure that we do 
not capture issues with randomly ordered papers, the results concerned with AER only take into account volumes 
that were published after 1985, a time at which a new editor was appointed. 
5 Editorials are ignored, and we consider the paper that follows as leading paper. Nobel lectures which appear as 
leading papers in AER have not been removed.  
6 See also Appendix Tables A1 for descriptive statistics concerning the dataset.  4 
  It is, however, important to condition on some other variables, including the length and 
the age of the paper, as well as distinguishing between notes and full-fledged papers. To this end, 
we set up the following model that will be estimated separately for EER and AER: 
 
      ya = !iOia
1
m
" + #La +$ Na + %& " Y&a + ua 
 
where subscript a refers to a given article, y is the number of times this article is cited (the count 
is made in 2000
7), the Oiaare dummy variables representing the order in which article a appears 
in an issue of the journal (Oiais equal to 1 if the order in which paper a is published is i, i = 1, 2, 
…, m), L is its length (number of pages), N is a dummy equal to 1 if the article is a note or 
comment, the Y are annual dummies that capture the time at which the article was published, and 
u an error term; !,",#,$ are parameters.  
  Both the order in which an article appears and the year in which it was published are 
represented by order or annual dummies to avoid assumptions on the functional form according 
to which a paper gains (or looses) citations according to its order, or when it gets older.
8 After 
some experimentation, and because the observed differences in citations counts remain roughly 
equal (and unrelated to order) after the fourth or fifth paper in an issue, we decided to report our 
results with m = 5 only. Since citations are count data, the equations are estimated using the 
Poisson regression model. 
  The results of three Poisson regressions (two for EER, one for AER) are displayed in 
Table 2. Since the rough results of count models (reproduced in column (1) of Appendix Tables 
A3, A4 and A6) are difficult to interpret, this table reports only the estimated marginal effects 
computed on the basis of the regression parameters.
9 The table also includes the mean number of 
citations. This is the mean predicted by the Poisson regression at the mean of each right-hand 
side variable.   
  Results show that first ordered papers get marginally more citations in all three versions 
of  the  model  (EER  alphabetically  ordered,  EER  non-alphabetically  ordered  and  AER).  As 
expected, the mean for AER is much larger than for EER (23 v. 5), and though the marginal 
effects show that the first paper in an issue benefits from a larger (and significantly different 
from zero in all three cases) number of citations, the marginal effects between AER and EER 
                                                 
7 Citations are counted in 2000, to papers published at the latest in 1997. There is thus at least a three-years lag 
between citations count and date of publication. 
8 We also ran regressions with time and time squared. This had very little influence on the “order” parameters that 
we are interested in here. 
9 See  Cameron  and Trivedi (2005, p. 669). For the parameters picked by dummy variables  such  as order,  the 
marginal effect is computed as the effect of changing the value of the dummy from 0 to 1. 5 
papers are not very large (5 v. 2 or 3). Moreover, for EER the difference in the marginal effect on 
citations of the first paper is not very different for alphabetical and non-alphabetical issues (1.8 
v.  3.1),  though  a  likelihood  ratio  test  shows  that  the  difference  is  statistically  significantly 
different from zero. Thus, there are less citations to the first paper when the order is alphabetical, 
but the difference is not large. Moreover, the differences in marginal citations between the first 
and  the  second  paper  are  almost  identical  (1.74  in  the  alphabetical  order,  1.69  in  the  non-
alphabetical order). Note that this difference is even smaller in the case of AER (1.00).
10 
  Longer papers are more cited than short ones, and notes are usually less cited (for AER 
the difference is quite large). The sequence of  annual dummies which represent the year of 
publication, and thus the age of the paper in 2000, pick coefficients that are declining in the case 
of AER. Thus, the more recent a paper, the less it is cited, which is expected. The coefficients 
show no particular trend for EER. One possible reason is that the natural decrease of citations for 
more recent papers is compensated by more citations due to increasing average quality over time. 
  We also examined the issue raised by Hudson (2007) who observes that a well-cited 
paper enhances citations to other papers in the same issue. To test for this, we ran a Poisson 
regression  (that  excludes  first  leading  papers),  pooling  alphabetical  and  non-alphabetical 
observations for EER. The equation is similar to the first one and reads: 
 
      ya = !Da + "La +# Na + $% & Y%a + ua  
 
It ignores orderings but includes a dummy  Da that takes the value 1 for alphabetically ordered 
issues. The coefficient picked by this dummy should tell us whether the average numbers of 
citations differ between the two types of orderings. This marginal effect turns out to be equal to -
0.38 with a standard error of 0.20. Thus, papers in alphabetically ordered issues attract less 
citations than those appearing in non-alphabetically ordered issues, but the difference is hardly 
significantly different from zero at the usual five percent probability level.
11  
  As a robustness check, a series of additional regressions were carried out, which confirm 
the results described above. We changed m (the number of ordered papers), replaced annual 
dummies by some imposed functional form of time between publication and citations in 2000 
(linear  and  quadratic),  and  varied  the  number  of  volumes  of  both  journals  included  in  the 
                                                 
10 It also worth mentioning that between 1985 and 1997, all AER papers that appear in order 1 to 8 get citations and 
only 2 percent and 4 percent of the papers ordered 9th and10th respectively, are not cited  This is far from being the 
case in EER, where some 15 percent of the papers never get cited, whatever their order. 
11 OLS estimation leads to a coefficient of -0.5, with a standard error of 1.05, confirming the result of the count 
model. 6 
regressions.
12  We  also  ran  some  regressions  in  which  we  pool  both  alphabetical  and  non-
alphabetical  issues.  Finally,  OLS  regressions  results  are  similar  to  those  obtained  with  the 
Poisson model. OLS can be justified for AER, since some papers get a large number of citations, 
and the independent variable can be considered continuous. But this approximation does not hold 




Our main conclusion drawn from the natural experiment run by European Economic Review is 
that the number of citations does hardly depend on the supposed higher quality of the leading 
paper, picked by the editor of a journal. An ordering of papers by alphabetical order of the initial 
of the surname of the (first) author has roughly the same effect as a “thoughtful” quality ordering 
that the editor(s) assume when they chose the order. This may however be the consequence of 
several alternative factors that cannot be distinguished:  
(a) The editors of EER gave poor quality signals, and readers cite more (or an equal number of 
times) papers that appear later in an issue;  
(b) Readers of EER think that the first paper in an issue is qualitatively better than those that 
follow, even if it is not, because they are used to this being the case in AER for example, but also 
in many other economics journals. 
  Whether this result is EER-specific should be verified using other journals which ran such 
“natural experiments.” 
  Do  these  observations  lead  to  policy  rules  that  should  be  followed  by  editors  who 
maximize  the  citations  given  to  papers  in  their  journal?  Clearly,  good  quality  papers  are 
important if citations is what counts, and has, according to Hudson (2007), positive externalities 
on  other  papers,  thus  enhancing  even  more  the  citations  to  a  journal.  This  is  however  not 
observed in our case.  
  Ranks of journals and citations have become important to evaluate scientists, though as 
made  clear  by  Oswald  (2007)  and  Hudson  (2007),  there  exist  highly-cited  papers  in  less 
reputable journals and citations may be due to chance.  
  It is less clear whether it is worth ordering papers in some order supposed to represent 
quality, since the number of additional citations given to leading papers is not much larger than 
those given to other papers. Obviously the cost to the editor of doing this is probably not very 
high, so why should he not do it? But it may be costly for young scientists, since well-established 
(and highly cited) scientists may win twice by getting even more citations than what they truly 
                                                 
12 See Appendix Tables A3 to A6, which give the results of Poisson regressions for the results described in the paper 
as well as for alternative formulations. 7 
deserve: first because they write good articles and second because their articles are placed as lead 
articles.  This  practice  may  result  in  intensifying  the  emergence  of  “superstars”,  help 
conservatism  and  even  crowd  out  some  good  articles  by  younger  scientists  who  do  not  get 
properly cited. 
  The appearance of new electronic journals, as well as the fact that old-time paper journals 
become electronic may induce changes in these patterns. Scientists are now becoming used to 
download individual papers, and have, in general, no access to the issues of a journal (though the 
journal still exists, even if virtually, and papers are ordered in each issue). But the fact that paper 
copies do not lie on the desk of a scientist will certainly have an influence in particular on the 
observation made by Hudson (but not confirmed for EER), that a well-cited paper enhances 
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Table 1. Cites conditional on order in an issue
EER alphabetical EER non-alphabetical AER
Mean Stand. Dev. Mean Stand. Dev. Mean Stand. Dev.
First in issue 7.7 10.6 11.4 17.6 45.4 35.5
Second in issue 5.6 6.2 8.9 24.8 49.0 46.4
Third in issue 5.5 8.9 5.8 6.9 37.8 48.4
Fourth in issue 5.5 8.8 5.1 6.3 42.5 44.9
Fifth in issue 6.3 6.7 4.7 5.9 30.3 29.6
Sixth in issue 4.1 5.2 7.2 11.9 38.7 31.3
Seventh in issue 6.4 11.9 5.9 7.7 41.8 50.9
Eight in issue 5.8 11.2 5.4 6.7 33.7 37.9
Ninth in issue 4.0 4.6 3.6 5.3 26.2 22.0
Tenth in issue 11.5 22.5 3.7 4.5 51.1 72.6
No. of obs. 303 760 1198
Table 2. Marginal effects in the Poisson regression
EER alphabetical EER non-alphabetical AER
Marg. Effect Stand. error Marg. Effect Stand. error Marg. Effect Stand. error
First in issue 1.88 0.47 3.12 0.33 5.19 0.44
Second in issues 0.14 0.42 1.43 0.30 4.20 0.43
Third in issue -0.11 0.40 -0.49 0.26 -0.87 0.41
Fourth in issue 0.74 0.46 -1.05 0.25 1.92 0.38
Fifth in issue 0.90 0.47 -1.41 0.25 -2.33 0.44
No. of pages 0.26 0.02 0.20 0.01 1.32 0.02
Note 0.48 2.84 -3.74 0.36 -13.05 0.25
Annual dummies yes yes yes
Mean 5.12 5.49 23.44
No. of obs. 303 760 119810 
 
Table A1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable No. of obs. Mean Std deviation Minimum Maximum
EER
Cites 1063 6.291 11.54 0 220
Alphabetical issues 1063 0.285 0.451 0 1
Order 1063 5.117 3.258 1 22
No. of pages 1063 17.689 7.156 2 53
Note 1063 0.022 0.148 0 1
First in issue 1063 0.121 0.326 0 1
Second in issue 1063 0.121 0.326 0 1
Third in issue 1063 0.121 0.326 0 1
Fourth in issue 1063 0.121 0.325 0 1
Fifth in issue 1063 0.111 0.314 0 1
AER
Cites 1198 28.751 39.981 0 473
Order 1198 12.459 7.3754 1 36
No. of pages 1198 13.18 6.687 1 53
Note 1198 0.226 0.418 0 1
First in issue 1198 0.043 0.203 0 1
Second in issue 1198 0.043 0.203 0 1
Third in issue 1198 0.043 0.203 0 1
Fourth in issue 1198 0.043 0.203 0 1
Fifth  in issue 1198 0.043 0.203 0 111 
Table A2 European Economic Review issues with 
alphabetical ordering of articles 
 
Year Issue Volume No
1974 54 5 4
1975 61 6 1
1975 62 6 2
1976 73 7 3
1976 83 8 3
1980 132 13 2
1980 142 14 2
1980 143 14 3
1983 213 21 3
1983 222 22 2
1983 223 22 3
1983 231 23 1
1983 232 23 2
1983 233 23 3
1984 241 24 1
1984 242 24 2
1984 243 24 3
1984 252 25 2
1984 253 25 3
1984 261 26 1
1984 263 26 3
1985 291 29 1
1985 292 29 2
1985 293 29 9
1987 315 31 5
1987 316 31 6
1987 317 31 7
1987 318 31 8
1988 321 32 1
1989 338 33 8
1992 368 36 8
1995 392 39 2
1995 396 39 6
1995 397 39 7
1995 399 39 9
1996 406 40 6
1996 409 40 9
1997 416 41 6
1997 417 41 7











Table A3 Alternative Results of Poisson Regressions, EER alphabetical
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First in issue 0.325 0.287 0.286
(0.072)** (0.071)** (0.071)**
Second in issue 0.027 -0.018 -0.018
(0.08) (0.079) (0.079)
Third in issue -0.021 -0.07 -0.071
(0.081) (0.080) (0.080)
Fourth in issue 0.138 0.06 0.059
(0.082) (0.080) (0.080)
Fifth  in issue 0.164 0.123 0.123
(0.081)* -0.081 -0.081
No. of pages 0.050 0.042 0.050 0.042
(0.004)** (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.003)**
Note 0.091 -0.037 0.22 -0.036









Intercept -0.200 1.135 0.041 1.141
(0.307) (0.131)** (0.306) (0.095)**
Annual dummies Yes No Yes No
No. of obs. 303 303 303 303
Dependent variable: No. of cites
Standard errors between brackets: * and ** significantly different from 0 at 5 and 1% level13 
Table A4 Alternative Results of Poisson Regressions, EER non-alphabetical
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First in issue 0.471 0.441 0.428
(0.042)** (0.042)** (0.042)**
Second in issue 0.237 0.25 -0.073
(0.045)** (0.044)** -0.049
Third in issue -0.092 -0.071 -0.073
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Fourth in issue -0.208 -0.21 -0.214
(0.054)** (0.054)** (0.053)**
Fifth  in issue -0.287 -0.273 -0.275
(0.056)** (0.056)** (0.056)**
No. of pages 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.039
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)**
Note -1.082 -1.037 -0.869 -0.994









Intercept 1.631 0.529 1.978 0.828
(0.097)** (0.096)** (0.101)** (0.054)**
Annual dummies Yes No Yes No
No. of obs. 760 760 760 759
Dependent variable: No. of cites
Standard errors between brackets: * and ** significantly different from 0 at 5 and 1% level14 
Table A5 Alternative Results of Poisson Regressions, EER all issues
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First in issue 0.493 0.471 0.466
(0.040)** (0.039)** (0.039)**
Second in issue 0.281 0.286 -0.029
(0.043)** (0.042)** (0.047)
Third in issue -0.036 -0.033 -0.028
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Fourth in issue -0.170 -0.170 -0.165
(0.052)** (0.052)** (0.052)**
Fifth  in issue -0.241 -0.240 -0.237
(0.055)** (0.055)** (0.054)**
First in issue*Alpha -0.302 -0.270 -0.263
(0.069)** (0.065)** (0.065)**
Second in issue*Alpha -0.414 -0.4 -0.081
(0.078)** (0.076)** -0.079
Third in issue*Alpha -0.156 -0.142 -0.142
(0.083) (0.081) (0.081)
Fourth in issue*Alpha 0.108 0.119 0.121
(0.085) (0.083) (0.083)
Fifth  in issue*Alpha 0.291 0.301 0.302
(0.088)** (0.086)** (0.086)**
No. of pages 0.039 0.038 0.041 0.04
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)**
Note -0.883 -0.903 -0.762 -0.869
(0.168)** (0.167)** (0.169)** (0.167)**










Intercept 0.236 0.827 0.359 0.903
(0.294) (0.076)** (0.293) (0.047)**
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
No. of obs. 1063 1063 1063 1062
Dependent variable: No. of cites
Standard errors between brackets: * and ** significantly different from 0 at 5 and 1% level15 
 
Table A6 Alternative Results of Poisson Regressions, AER
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First in issue 0.202 0.189 0.189
(0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)**
Second in issue 0.166 0.158 0.155
(0.021)** (0.021)** (0.021)**
Third in issue -0.038 -0.052 -0.053
(0.024) (0.024)* (0.024)*
Fourth in issue 0.079 0.07 0.068
(0.023)** (0.023)** (0.023)**
Fifth  in issue -0.104 -0.112 -0.11
(0.026)** (0.026)** (0.026)**
No. of pages 0.057 0.057 0.05 0.059
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Note -0.654 -0.635 -0.339 -0.594
(0.020)** (0.020)** (0.023)** (0.020)**








Intercept 1.835 0.544 1.500 1.310
(0.032)** (0.055)** (0.034)** (0.026)**
Annual dummies Yes No No No
No. of obs. 1198 1198 1198 1198
Dependent variable: No. of cites
Standard errors between brackets: * and ** significantly different from 0 at 5 and 1% level